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Lazer: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND:
THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPANSION OF
SUBSEQUENT OWNERS' RIGHTS UNDER THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE
HonorableLeon D. Lazer'
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 2 is an important case that
significantly impacts New York and its existing standards for
challenging a taking of property by governmental regulation. The
prevailing doctrine relative to taking by regulatory rules, zoning
regulations or environmental regulations is well known.' The
New York rule, which is also the nationwide rule, provides that if
a regulation or ordinance deprives the owner of all productive use
or reasonable return from the owner's land, this constitutes a
taking and is therefore unconstitutional. 4
In a declarative
judgment proceeding, in addition to arguing that an ordinance is a
taking for which the government must compensate, a party can
claim that, in enacting the ordinance, the legislative body
exceeded its authority to regulate private property, and therefore
The Honorable Leon D. Lazer is a graduate of the City College of New
York, and received his LL.B from New York University Law School. Judge
Lazer served as an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, Second
Department, from 1979 to 1986 and was a New York State Supreme Court
judge from 1973 to 1986. He was a partner in the New York law firm of Shea
& Gould; Town Attorney for the Town of Huntington1, New York; member of
the Temporary State Commission to Study Governmental Costs in Nassau and
Suffolk Counties; Chair of Pattern Jury Instructions Committee of the New
York State Association of Supreme Court Justices; author of many published
judicial opinions; member of the American Law Institute; member of the
American and New York State Bar Associations and the Association of
Supreme Court Justices of New York State. Judge Lazer retired from the
bench in 1986.
2 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
3 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V. states: "[n]or shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation"; N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 7(a) states:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation";
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Gazza
v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 89 N.Y.2d 603, 616-17, 657
N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 813 (1997).
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the ordinance is unconstitutional. 5 This is law with which we are
all familiar.
The impact of Palazzolo in New York flows from its
effect on recent holdings of the New York Court of Appeals. In
1997, the Court decided Gazza v. New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation. 6 Gazza owned wetland property
and applied to the Department of Environmental Conservation
("DEC") for setback variances in order to build on the uplands
of the parcel. His application was denied. 7 He then brought an
action claiming a taking by the DEC. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals made what for many observers was a surprising
determination. The Court held since the wetland restriction was
in effect when Gazza acquired the title, the restriction merged
into the title and could not be challenged by him.8 The Court of
Appeals ruled on three similar cases the same day, arriving at the
same conclusions. 9
According to the Gazza Court, if a party buys property
subject to a zoning regulation or an environmental regulation, that
party cannot challenge the regulation under the so-called 'Lucas
rule' of a complete taking.' 0 In Anello v. Zoning Board of
Appeals," one of the other three cases decided the same day as
Gazza, the Court handed down a similar decision relative to a
steep-slope ordinance. 12 Similar holdings were issued in Kim v.
City of New York, 13 a lateral support case and in Basile v. Town

' See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 ("while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
689 N.Y.2d at 603, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
' Id.

B Id.

at 608-09, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
at 615-16, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560-61.

9 The three other "takings" cases decided by the Court of Appeals on the
same day as Gazza are: Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 89 N.Y.2d 535, 656
N.Y.S.2d 184; Basile v. Town of Southampton, 89 N.Y.2d 974, 655
N.Y.S.2d 877, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997); Kim v. City of New York,
90 N.Y.2d 1, 659 N.Y.S.2d 145, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 809 (1997).
10 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 615-16, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 560-61.
" 89 N.Y.2d 53, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184.
12Id.

at 538, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
"390 N.Y.2d at 8, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49.
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of Southampton, 14 another wetlands case. So in four cases, the
Court of Appeals established the rule that if property is acquired
subject to a restriction, the buyer is stuck with the restriction with
respect to a claim of a taking.
The leading United States Supreme Court case on the
issue of taking by regulation is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 15 where the Court held that in order for the regulation to
be a taking, there must be a complete extinction of productive use
of the property. 16 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, noted that the
Court's rule was "wholly arbitrary", and would mean that
landowners deprived of 95 percent of use of their property could
not recover. However, a landowner who lost 100 percent of its
property use could recover the complete value as compensation
for the taking. 17 Complete extinction is the requirement for a
taking under Lucas, as written by Justice Scalia. 8
Is a showing of complete extinction of productive use of
property the only way to challenge a zoning regulation under the
takings clause? There is another way, which is outlined in the
case of Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City,
decided in the late 1970's.19 Penn Central entered into an
agreement to lease the airspace over the magnificent Grand
Central Terminal on 42nd Street, for which it was to receive
$3,000,000 a year. 20 Jackie Kennedy 21 was among the many who
fought to save the unique facade of the terminal. As a result of
efforts like hers, Grand Central Terminal was designated a
landmark under New York City's Landmark ordinance, 22 and the
City refused to allow the proposed development of a 55 story
89 N.Y.2d at 976, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 878-79.
"sLucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
16Id.
17 Id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 1015-16.
14

'9438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 115-16 (describing Grand Central Terminal as "one of New York
City's most famous buildings").
21 Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis (1929-1994), widow of John F. Kennedy, the
35th President of the United States and also widow of Aristotle S. Onassis, a
Greek businessman, at http://gi/grolier.com/presidents/es/first/35PW.html.
22 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115-116.
20
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tower on top of the existing structure.23 The challenge to the
ordinance went all the way up to the United States Supreme
Court, which ultimately sustained it. The Court's decision
sustaining the ordinance was partly based on the provision that
permitted Penn Central to sell or transfer some of the
development rights on nearby property that it owned.24
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court reasoned there was
no complete taking. Transfers of development rights are not
worth very much, but in that era this fact was not well known.
Thus, there are two ways for an owner to approach a
takings case. One way is to follow the Penn Central route and
the other is to follow the Lucas case; but the Lucas route requires
total extinction of productive use.25 In Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island,26 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, looked back
at Penn Central and observed that the case has always been a
mystery.
According to Justice Kennedy, even where the
regulation falls short of eliminating all beneficial use, under Penn
Central a taking may have occurred depending on a number of
factors.27 The factors include the character of the government
action, the extent to which it interferes with distinct investment
backed expectations, and the economic impact on the property
owned. 28 What "investment backed expectations" means has
eluded clarity for a number of years. In Gazza, because of the
upland, the property in question had some residual value, but
Gazza had argued a complete extinction of use. To the extent
that he argued the applicability of Penn Central, the Court of
Appeals did not accept his contentions.
It found that his
"reasonable expectations were reflected by his consideration of
the inherent limitations on the property when he made the
purchase offer for thousands less than its worth without the
23

Id. at 116-17.

24 Id. at 137. The Court found that the transferable development rights
mitigated the financial burden of the terminal's landmark designation, and

therefore,
to be considered in the analysis.
2 5Lucas had
505 U.S. at 1015-16.
26 533 U.S.at 606.
27 id.
28 Id.
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restrictions.
Thus, his 'reasonable' expectations
were not
29
restricted."
remained
property
the
when
affected
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island30 dealt with a situation similar
to the one in Gazza because it also involved ownership of
wetlands and a denial of variances for 18 acres of property. The
corporation that originally owned the property had its charter
revoked in 1971, 3l the same year the Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Council enacted very stringent provisions
regarding development of wetland property. 32 In 1978, Palazzolo
became successor-in-interest to the corporation's rights in the
property as sole shareholder,33 and later challenged the 1971
environmental regulations as a complete taking. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court rejected his attack on the regulations,
holding 'a la Gazza', that when Palazzolo bought the property, he
took title to it subject to the environmental regulations, therefore,
he could not now attack those regulations. 34 Furthermore, in
response to Palazzolo's Penn Central argument, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court questioned the kind of distinct investment-backed
expectation Palazollo could have had when he obtained the
property, subject to the regulations. 35 The Court dismissed the
complaint and ultimately the United States Supreme Court found
the Rhode Island rule to be unconstitutional. 36
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether a purchaser or successive titleholder is deemed to have
notice of an earlier enacted restriction, and is therefore barred
from claiming that it affects a taking. 37 Writing for the six to

three majority, Justice Kennedy wrote this dispositive language:

29 Gazza, 89 N.Y.2d at 619, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 564.

30 533 U.S. at 606.
31 Id. at 614.
32

Id.

33 Id.

3 Id. at 616.
35 id.
36

Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.

37 Id.
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[w]ere we to accept the State's rule the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State
of its obligation to defend any action restricting
land use no matter how extreme or unreasonable.
A State would be allowed in effect to put an
expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought
not be the rule. Future generations have a right to
challenge unreasonable limitations of the land.38
The majority opinion went on to reason that if the Rhode
Island rule were followed, distinctions would develop between
old owners and new owners and between owners that have wealth
and can litigate and owners that have the need to immediately
sell.39 Justice Kennedy's opinion established a bright line rule
that any holding that provides that an owner who acquires title
subject to certain restrictions cannot challenge the restrictions is
unconstitutional. 40
Concurring, Justice O'Connor cautioned that this rule
might paint too bright a line.4 ' She hypothesized a situation
where a person would buy a restricted-use property at an already
reduced price and proceed to achieve a windfall by successfully
litigating a takings claim.42 Justice O'Connor believed that it
would be more prudent to consider the timing of a purchase and a
claim without a bright line rule.43 Then, she took a strong swipe
at Justice Scalia's opinion. I do not know what is going on
between these two folks. But in a footnote Justice O'Connor
asserted that Justice Scalia's "inapt government as thief simile is
symptomatic of the larger failing of his opinion."44 Justice Scalia
responded, and referred to Justice O'Connor's previously
mentioned hypothetical as the "polar horrible," and made other

3 Id. at 625.
39 Id. at 627.
4
41

id.
Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634.
43
1Id.at 633.
44Id. at 634.
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references to the error of her opinion. 45 He joined the majority's
holding that the timing of the regulation should have no effect on
whether the taking is unconstitutional. 46
There are dissenting opinions in Palazzolo, written by
Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer. Justices Ginsberg and
Breyer believed the case was not ripe for review, therefore, they
took issue with the majority's proceeding to decide the case on its
merits. 4 Justice Stevens, although concurring with the majority
that the case was ripe, agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme
Court on the merits that Palazzolo could not challenge the
regulation. a
As a result of Palazollo, Gazza has been overruled. 49 The
timing of the regulation relative to the owner's title does not
preclude a takings claim.50 Incidentally, although Palazzolo won
on the principal issue, he lost the case under the 'Lucas' claim
because his property had at least a $200,000 value. He had
argued total extinction of productive use, but two acres of the
twenty-acre parcel was upland property and could be developed,
which left him only the Penn Central claim to be determined on
remand.51
So we are back to where we were before Gazza. Gazza
and its progeny are now gone in New York. Furthermore, a
property owner does not have to establish total extinction of use
when arguing that a taking has occurred, Penn Central is still
waiting in the wings.

4,

Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).

46id.
47

Id. at 646 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
U.S. at 637-645 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting

41 Palazzolo, 533

in part).
49 Id.

'o Id. at 630.
1 Id. On remand to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the case was further
remanded to the trial court for the necessary findings of fact.

Palazzolo v.

Rhode Island, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001).
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